This paper examines the effect of governance on the quality of firms' voluntary disclosure of intangibles. While disclosure of intangibles reduces information asymmetry, company-level managerial ownership and country-level institutional environment provide incentives that can affect the quality of disclosure. I use a comprehensive set of information about intangibles for disclosure, the aggregate percentage of ownership by directors for managerial ownership, and an index of legal institutions for institutional environments. Based on data from 430 East Asian firms, lower quality disclosure is evident for firms in stronger institutional environment regime. However, the quality of disclosure is not affected by managerial ownership or its joint-effect with institutional environment. The findings highlight the importance of voluntary disclosure about intangibles regardless of the influencing effect of governance mechanisms.
Introduction
This paper examines the role of governance in corporate voluntary disclosure practice associated with information about intangibles. Investors often use firms' voluntary disclosure of information about intangibles when financial statements are less informative about the market value of the company (Jones, 2007) . In the context of intangibles, firms supplement traditional financial reports with nonfinancial information (Amir and Lev, 1996) . While many studies have been conducted to understand the nature and extent of voluntarily disclosed information on intangibles (e.g., Guthrie and Petty, 2000) , this paper fills the gap in the literature by considering the effect of governance on the quality of voluntary disclosure of intangibles by firms.
Analysing East Asian firms' governance and voluntary disclosure of intangibles is relevant for two important reasons. Firstly, firms in East Asia are often characterised by highly concentrated ownership (La Porta et al., 1998) , with complicated pyramid structures and crossholdings. The involvement of management in corporate control, coupled with the lack of well-governed institutional investors in East Asia, provide managers and controlling owners with the incentive and ability for opportunistic behaviour. Secondly, East Asian companies are heavily influenced by managerial incentives that stem from the salient features of the East Asian institutional environments. Ball et al. (2003) characterised East Asian firms to have higher political influence and lower anticipated cost of shareholder litigation and give lesser consideration to the importance of institutional shareholders and public debt. While the East Asian economies are known for the widespread influence of personal and political connections, the institutional features of countries in East Asia vary according to the effectiveness of the laws and the political economy in each country. The problematic characteristics of corporate ownership structure in East Asia, along with ineffective corporate governance, a weak legal structure and an underdeveloped market structure have the propensity to generate substantial agency problem.
This study considers the effect of governance mechanisms, both at firm and country-level, on corporate voluntary disclosure practice related to intangibles. Prior studies (e.g., García-Meca and Martínez, 2007) show that firms provide a variety of information relating to intangibles and these information are valued by investors (e.g., Guo et al., 2005 , Xu et al., 2007 .
However, governance mechanisms create managerial incentive that may influence corporate disclosure strategies. While evidence from prior studies suggests that the variation in firms' ownership structure and other institutional features of the economy affect the quality of firms' financial reporting (Holthausen, 2009 , Kothari, 2000 , Ball, 2001 ), the effect of governance mechanisms on voluntary disclosure of intangibles has not been thoroughly researched. This is mainly because the majority of prior studies in this area tend to focus on a single country, especially in the Western context. Moreover, prior studies have not considered the possibility that company-level and country-level governance jointly affect corporate voluntary disclosure practice involving intangibles.
The current study attempts to fill the gap in the existing literature by examining the association between the institutional environment, firms' managerial ownership, and their voluntary disclosures of intangibles.
Firms' voluntary disclosure of intangibles is derived from an index of a comprehensive set of information about human resources, customers, information technology, processes, research and development, and strategy. The aggregate percentage of ownership of equity securities by directors represents firms' managerial ownership and an aggregate index of legal and political institutions measures country-level institutional environments. Sample for this study consists of 430 publicly listed firms from Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
Results show that the quality of firms' voluntary disclosure of intangibles is not affected by their managerial ownership. However, the quality of voluntary disclosure is lower for firms in stronger institutional environment as compared to firms in weaker institutional environment. Further, there is no evidence to support the joint-effect of managerial ownership and institutional environment on the quality of voluntary disclosure of intangibles. The results could be attributable to the fact that the importance of disclosure about intangibles in reducing information asymmetry in intangible-intensive firms prevails over the incentive from managerial ownership and institutional environment.
This study adds to the limited body of research on voluntary disclosure of intangibles in East Asia as previous studies have mainly focused on the Western economies. This study also provides evidence on corporate disclosure strategy related to intangibles from the perspective of jurisdictions with high information asymmetry. Further, I consider factors that are prevalent in explaining the variations in voluntary disclosure of intangibles by firms in East Asia by examining the effect of incentives that are sourced from managerial ownership and institutional environments. More importantly, this paper examines the joint-effect of company-and country-level governance on the voluntary disclosure of intangibles, a point of differentiation from previous related studies that have examined only one influencing factor. Findings of this study have practical implications for participants in stock markets. The evidence shows that the need to reduce information asymmetry concerning intangibles through voluntary disclosure of non-financial information on intangibles may be more important than the influencing effect of governance mechanisms. This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, the literature that leads to the hypotheses development is discussed.
Section 3 explains the research methodology. Results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature and Hypotheses Development
Companies undertake many investments on intangibles to generate future benefits (Webster, 1999) . However, Wyatt and Abernethy (2008) argue that full capitalization of the investments is not feasible because they are highly uncertain. The IAS 38, which specifies the current accounting treatment on intangibles, is commonly perceived to be too conservative because the standard has many restrictive recognition criteria. While there are calls for drastic reform of the current reporting practice related to intangibles (Garcia-Ayuso, 2003, Lev, 2001 ), the characteristics of intangibles make it difficult for the recognition rules of intangibles to be modified without changing the overall accounting model and for the implementation of mandatory disclosure for intangibles (Skinner, 2008) . As a result, many intangibles remain undisclosed.
Companies respond to the deficiencies in financial reporting by opting for voluntary disclosure practice. In the context of intangibles, voluntary disclosure strategy can be used to provide additional information about recognised intangibles and explanations of unrecognised intangibles. Prior studies (e.g., García-Meca and Martínez, 2007) have used a range of frameworks 43 to analyse voluntary reporting of intangibles. They show that firms provide a variety of information relating to intangibles including business collaborations, work-related competencies, strategic alliances, and human capital development. Many of the disclosed information refer to investment on intangibles which are not suitable for inclusion in financial statements. Further, capital market studies involving intangibles (e.g., Guo et al., 2005 , Xu et al., 2007 show that investors value voluntary non-financial disclosure about intangibles. Findings on the capital market benefit of voluntary disclosure of intangibles are consistent with the agency theory argument that voluntary disclosure reduces investor uncertainty about the quality of the company and the expected returns from its securities. In view of that, voluntary disclosure of intangibles plays a role in alleviating information asymmetry surrounding intangibles.
Despite the evidence on the importance of voluntary disclosure of intangibles, disclosure strategies can vary between companies that have different managerial incentives. This paper considers two sources of incentives: (1) corporate ownership structure, and (2) countries' institutional environment. Both governance mechanisms create incentives for managers to engage in activities that are either growth-enhancing or growth-degenerative for their companies. Corporate ownership structure and other institutional features of the economy influence the development of accounting standards and practices (Gray, 1988 , Saudagaran and Diga, 2000 , Craig and Diga, 1998 , and, in turn, shape the quality of financial reporting (Holthausen, 2009 , Kothari, 2000 , Ball, 2001 ).
According to the proponents of agency theory, the structure of corporate ownership provides differential incentives that influence corporate reporting. From one perspective, greater managerial ownership leads to interest-alignment effect that positively affect company (Warfield et al., 1995) . From another perspective, greater managerial ownership leads to entrenchment effect that adversely affect the company (Wiwattanakantang, 2001 (Kelton and Yang, 2008) . The mixed findings in these studies could be related to the different types of voluntary disclosure practiced by firms.
Prior related studies have not examined the relation between firm ownership and voluntary nonfinancial disclosure related to intangibles. For intangible-intensive firms, the role of managerial ownership is intensified because managers have greater discretionary power as they are the decision makers in the firms. The benefits and the costs of information on intangibles are high, making it likely that greater managerial incentives are involved in the decision to voluntarily disclose information on intangibles. On the one hand, one would expect that the importance of voluntarily disclosing information of intangibles prevails over the incentives from managerial ownership because the disclosure can reduce information asymmetry that is high in intangible-intensive firms. On the other hand, due to the high proprietary cost of information on intangibles, managerial ownership may lead to the withholding of information in intangible-intensive firms. However, the debate surrounding the influence of corporate managerial ownership on firms' voluntary disclosure of intangibles has not been sufficiently examined in the current academic conversation.
Prior related studies have also overlooked the East Asian context. The role of managerial ownership in the East Asian firms is different from those of the Western firms because of differences in countries' institutional features. Following the argument in Fan and Wong (2002) , managerial ownership is associated with greater incentives for managerial entrenchment rather than alignment of interest with shareholders. As a result, the quality of voluntary disclosure of intangibles is expected to be lower for firms with greater managerial ownership. The hypothesis is as follows:
H 1 There is a negative association between firmlevel managerial ownership and the quality of voluntary disclosure of intangibles.
While the first hypothesis relies on the role of managerial ownership as a governance mechanism, issues of governance that align the objectives of managers and shareholders can originate from the institutional features of an economy. La Porta et al. (1997) indicate that managers behave more opportunistically in an environment with weak shareholder protection, while a less corrupt government makes it difficult for corporate insiders and bureaucrats to steal from investors. Corporate governance practices, such as the protection of minority shareholders, differ and depend on whether the legal system is shareholder-based or stakeholderbased. Common law countries, which rely on the 'shareholder' governance model, has higher transparency level (Ball et al., 2000) because information asymmetry is resolved by public disclosure as compared to code law countries. In the context of East Asia, a region known for widespread influence of personal and political connections, the countries' institutional features vary according to the effectiveness of the laws and the political economy in each country.
Prior studies show that the influence of law is significant in explaining the variation in the quality of non-financial information worldwide. Generally, findings of prior studies suggest that disclosure intensity is greater for companies in common law countries (Jaggi and Low, 2000 , Hope, 2003 , Khanna et al., 2004 . Using a sample of 34 countries, Francis et al. (2005) find that disclosures are higher for firms in countries with stronger investor protection but no significant results is found on the relation between firms' disclosure and the variable for a country's financial system. The level of firms' disclosure of intangibles can be explained by a broad range of national, political, and economic systems (Williams, 1999, Archambault and Archambault, 2003) , although these studies find contradicting results with regards to the effect of countries' legal systems, level of economic development and development of the equity market. In a similar vein, Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) show that governance transparency 44 is higher in countries with common law legal origin and high judicial efficiency, while financial transparency 45 is explained by political economy, and is higher in countries with a low state ownership of enterprises, a low state ownership of banks, and a low state expropriation of company wealth.
In sum, studies that use sample of firms from various countries have the ability to provide a comprehensive picture regarding corporate voluntary disclosure practice. The existing evidence generally shows that the variation in disclosure can be explained by country-level institutional features that act as a source of managerial incentives. With respect to the disclosure of intangibles, the role of the institutional environment is even more important as the property rights of intangibles are protected through the existence of law and the effectiveness of enforcement. Arguably, in countries with insecure property rights, there will be relatively less investment in intangibles, and less disclosure about investments on intangibles.
As East Asia is composed of countries with diversified institutional features 46 , East Asian companies are exposed to different managerial incentives that are sourced from the idiosyncratic features of the countries. Based on the prior evidence suggesting that institutional factors differ across countries and that those differences lead to the variations in the nature and extent of disclosure, the current study extends the literature on the voluntary disclosure of intangibles by considering the effect of countries' institutional environments. The hypothesis is as follows:
H 2 There is a positive association between country-level institutional environment and the quality of voluntary disclosure of intangibles. 44 Information that can be used to hold officers and directors accountable. 45 Timeliness, intensity, interpretation and dissemination of financial disclosures. 46 For example, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are common-law countries, while Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan are code law countries. Despite the typical classification based on legal origin, Leuz et al. (2003) and Ball et al. (2003) highlight the idiosyncratic features of the institutional environment in East Asian markets.
The above hypotheses examine the effect of either the managerial ownership or the legal environment on corporate voluntary disclosure of intangibles. Previous related studies have suggested that company-and country-level incentives interact to jointly affect the extent of firms' voluntary disclosure of intangibles. Webb et al. (2008) find that the interaction between globalization and the legal environment is significantly associated with firms' voluntary disclosures. Results indicate that the effect of company globalisation on voluntary disclosure is greater for firms residing in code law countries. While globalization creates a demand for voluntary disclosure in multinational firms that have greater information asymmetry, the role of globalization is greater for firms operating in weak legal and judicial institutional framework at home than for firms based in countries with strong legal environments. Contrary to that, Francis et al. (2005) find that the effect of a company's external financing needs on voluntary disclosure of intangibles is not conditional on the legal environment related to investor protection rights and financial structure. They indicate that firm-level voluntary disclosure incentives are themselves an important factor globally and operate independently of country-specific factors.
Many previous related studies (e.g., García-Meca and Martínez, 2007) on voluntary disclosure have also not considered the interaction effect of company-level and country-level incentives in reporting quality, while a few studies that do consider the joint effects provide mixed evidence. Nevertheless, Webb et al. (2008) and Francis et al. (2005) suggest the idea that the interaction between company-level and country-level factors should be considered in analysing the variation in firms' voluntary disclosure. Following that, the interaction between firms' managerial ownership and the countries' legal environment is expected to be significantly associated with voluntary disclosures of intangibles. The hypothesis is as follows:
H 3 Firm-level managerial ownership and country-level institutional environment jointly affect the quality of voluntary disclosure of intangibles.
Research Methodology
The sample for this study consists of 430 firms from East Asian countries, namely Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. I randomly select firms that have the following information for the year 2007: (i) data in Compustat, (ii) intangible assets or research and development expenditure, (iii) English language version annual report, and (iv) information on managerial ownership in the annual report or OSIRIS. Data have been screened and filtered to remove outliers and other data distortions. The sample size of 430 is considered reasonable because of the time consuming nature of the data collection process. Nevertheless, the sample size compares favourably with cross-countries studies using hand-collected data from annual reports (e.g., Webb et al., 2008 , Cahan et al., 2005 , including studies that use Asian samples (e.g., Williams, 1999) .
The following model is used to test the hypotheses:
Where: DISC is the disclosure score measuring the extent of voluntary information about intangibles, OWN is a dichotomous variable of one (1) if the aggregate percentage of equity securities by executive and non-executive directors is more than the sample median, and zero (0) otherwise, INS is a dichotomous variable of one (1) if a firm resides in a country with a strong institutional environment, and zero (0) otherwise, PROFIT is the net profit margin, LEV is the percentage of total debt to total assets, GROWTH is the growth in sales, TOBINSQ is the market capitalization divided by book value of total assets, SIZE is the total sales in its log term, and IND is a dichotomous value of one (1) if the firm belongs to that industry, and zero (0) otherwise.
The test variables in the regression model are OWN, INS and the interaction between those two (OWNxINS), which are explained further below. The model in equation (1) tests the association of (i) ownership (OWN) with voluntary disclosure of intangibles (H 1 ) and (ii) institutional environment (INS) with voluntary disclosure of intangibles (H 2 ) as a separate and independent effect. A significant negative coefficient is expected for α 2 , while α 3 is expected to be positive and significant. OWNxINS, which tests for H 3 , proxies for jointeffect of managerial ownership and institutional environment on voluntary disclosure of intangibles. The coefficient for the interaction variable is estimated to be significant to indicate that the quality of voluntary disclosure of intangibles is determined by both firm-level and country-level governance.
Dependent Variable -Voluntary Disclosure of Intangibles (DISC)
DISC is derived from the content analysis of annual reports based on a six-category index that closely follows Bukh et al. (2005) . The categories in the index are: (1) Human Resource (HR), which covers workforce-based assets, (2) Customers, which covers customer-based assets and market-based assets, (3) Information Technology (IT), which represents intangibles related to information technology initiatives and systems that increase company efficiency and productivity, (4) Processes, which refers to intangibles related to programmes that increase efficiency and productivity, (5) R&D, which incorporates information on the programmes and progress of R&D, innovation and, intellectual property, and (6) Strategy, which includes the intangible benefits from the strategic execution of companies.
To capture voluntary information about intangibles, sections which are subject to regulatory requirements, such as the corporate governance report, are excluded. The disclosed information is scored using a 0-3 scoring system, based on the quality of information. A score of 0 is given for nondisclosure, 1 if the information is disclosed but the level of information is minimal, 2 if the information is disclosed and the level of information is average and 3, if the information is disclosed and the level of information is high. Institutional environment (INS) is derived from an index constructed by Berkowitz et al. (2003) . The index measures the judiciary's effectiveness, the rule of law, the absence of corruption, the low risk of contract repudiation and the low risk of government expropriation in a particular country. The index is relevant to the current study that focuses on intangibles as (a) the protection of property rights in intangible assets presents difficulties, and (b) these problems may differ across the countries that are included in the analysis. The score for the index represents the effectiveness of the institutions that enforce the law in a country, with higher scores corresponding to a better legal and political environment. To incorporate the variable in the model, a score of one (1) is given to firms classified in the INS High group and a score of zero (0) is given to firms classified in the INS Low group. Firm-specific variables were included in the regression model to control for factors that have been found to be associated with firms' voluntary disclosures.
Independent Variables
Net profit margin proxies for profitability (PROFIT), percentage of total debt to total assets proxies for leverage (LEV), growth in sales proxies for growth (GROWTH), Tobin's Q proxies for firm valuation (TOBINSQ), and total assets proxies for size (SIZE). These variables are commonly used as control variables in prior studies on voluntary disclosure (e.g., Francis et al., 2005) . To control for the systematic industry effect on voluntary disclosure, variables for industry (IND) are included in the model.
Findings
The composition of the sample (untabulated) based on countries shows that the highest representation is by Malaysian firms (17.91 percent), while the lowest is Taiwanese firms (8.84 percent) . The most common industries are industrial with a composition of 24.87 percent of the sample. Firms from the energy, health care, financial services, telecommunication services and utilities industries, each make up less than 5 percent of the overall sample.
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 Table 2 also reports the correlations between independent variables, which can be considered to be small. Overall, the correlation results between the independent variables do not suggest any concern for multicollinearity. Table 3 shows that the coefficients for PROFIT and LEV are significant at the 10 percent level, while the coefficients for TOBINSQ and SIZE are significant at the 1 percent level. PROFIT and LEV are negatively associated with DISC, and positive association is reported between DISC and TOBINSQ and DISC and SIZE. Except for PROFIT, the results of other control variables are consistent with prior studies on voluntary disclosure (e.g., Francis et al., 2005) .
In Model 1, the variables of interest are managerial ownership (OWN) and institutional environment (INS).
Findings reveal that the coefficient for managerial ownership OWN is not statistically significant. Hence, there is no evidence to support that firms' managerial ownership has a negative effect on voluntary disclosure of intangibles, as predicted by H 1. The coefficient for institutional environment (INS) is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. While H 2 predicts that institutional environment positively affects firms' voluntary disclosure of intangibles, the results in Table 3 show otherwise. The negative coefficient of INS suggests that the association between country-level institutional environment and firms' voluntary disclosure of intangibles is negative.
After controlling for firms' characteristics, including the level of managerial ownership, the results indicate that voluntary disclosure of intangibles is lower for firms in stronger institutional environment compared to firms in weaker environment.
In Model 2, the results for managerial ownership (OWN) and institutional environment (INS) remain the same as in Model 1. The coefficient for managerial ownership is not statistically significant and the coefficient for institutional environment is significant and negative. The main variable of interest is the interaction between managerial ownership and institutional environment (OWNxINS), which is used to test H 3. The coefficient for OWNxINS is not statistically significant, which means that H 3 is not supported. Statistical results indicate that there is no evidence to support that managerial ownership and country-level institutional environment jointly affect firms' voluntary disclosure of intangibles.
The above findings warrant explanations. First, the results show that OWN, which proxies for managerial ownership, is not associated with voluntary disclosure of intangibles. The insignificant finding could be due to the inconclusive results from prior literature regarding the relationship between managerial ownership and disclosure. Secondly, contrary to the prediction in the second hypothesis, institutional environment (INS) is negatively associated with voluntary disclosure of intangibles. The results suggest a possibility that, in weak institutional environments, firms have more incentive to provide credible and informative disclosures. This is because information on intangibles is highly valued by investors, and failure to disclose such information would lead the investors would to view the companies skeptically. Thirdly, there is no evidence that the disclosure effects are conditional on the interaction between managerial ownership and country-level institutional environment. In a way or so, the insignificant results are consistent with the findings in Francis et al. (2005) . Finally, it is also possible that these idiosyncratic results relate to the sample of this study and the voluntary disclosure that I focus on. As the sample consists of intangible-intensive firms, the importance of disclosure in reducing information asymmetry could prevail over the incentive from managerial ownership and institutional environment.
I performed additional analyses to test the sensitivity of the results in Table 3 . First, the dependent variable (DISC) is replaced with alternative measures. Following prior studies (e.g., Jones, 2007 , Webb et al., 2008 , I use the following measures: a) DISC-ITEM which is the total score of items rated on a binary scale, b) DISC-GROUP which is a dichotomous variable with a value of one for total disclosure score equals to, or greater than, the sample median and zero otherwise, c) DISC-RANK which is the ranking of the companies according to their disclosure scores and d) DISC-COUNTRYMEAN which is the deviation of a company's disclosure score from the mean disclosure scores of their country. The statistical evidence (untabulated) is similar to the evidence reported in the Table 3 . Thus, the main findings are robust to the different scoring systems that can be used to measure disclosure scores.
Second, following Webb et al. (2008) , I have included an additional control variable for 56 firms that are also listed in the US stock exchange (CROSS-LISTED). CROSS-LISTED takes a value of one for cross-listed firms, and zero otherwise. Prior studies provide evidence that being cross-listed in the US is positively associated with disclosure (Khanna et al., 2004) . Arguably, foreign firms which are cross-listed in the USA have greater pressure to provide higher quality financial reporting as they are subject to the more stringent U.S. financial reporting regime and stronger enforcement power of the U.S. The findings (untabulated) are consistent with the main results in Table 3 . The variable CROSS-LISTED is not statistically significant, while the coefficients of other variables are of the same significance level and sign as those reported in the main analysis. While there is a possibility that firms cross-listed in the US may have different incentives for financial reporting, the results imply that the main findings are robust to the effect of cross-listed firms.
Thirdly, the effect of having 110 hightechnology firms in the sample is considered. Although I control for an industry effect, there is a possibility that there are influences from firms in high-technology industries that have not been captured by the dichotomous variable for industry. Firms in the high-technology industries tend to have higher level of intangibles and are more likely to voluntarily disclose information on intangibles (Gelb, 2002) . Regression analysis is undertaken using the classification 47 of high-technology firms from Kile and Phillips (2009) . Based on the 6 digit GICS codes, firms are segregated into two groups, where a value of one is given to firms in high-technology industries and zero, if otherwise. Equation (1) is adjusted by removing the dummy variables for industries and adding HIGHTECH, the variable that represent firms in high-technology industries. Results (untabulated) show that HIGHTECH is positive and significant, which means that firms in high technology industries provide greater disclosure of intangibles than firms in other industries. Further, the coefficients of other variables are consistent with those reported in the main analysis. The results suggest that the main findings are robust to the influence of hightechnology firms.
Overall, results reveal that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis on the joint-effect of managerial ownership and institutional environment on firms' voluntary non-financial disclosure of intangibles. Contrary to what is expected, the quality of voluntary disclosure of intangibles is not jointly determined by the company and country-level governance. However, firms residing in stronger institutional environment provide lesser quality disclosure compared to firms in weaker institutional environment. Results in this study are robust to the different ways the disclosure is scored, and after controlling for firms cross-listed in the US and firms in high technology industries.
Conclusion
This study looks at the joint-effect of the variations in firm-level managerial ownership and country-level institutional environment in analysing the quality of voluntary disclosure of intangibles. The role of managerial ownership of firms in East Asia, added together with the legal and political institutions across the countries are important in the analysis involving intangibles since the value of many intangibles is conditional on the quality of governance, such as the laws on property rights. While evidence from prior 47 Prior studies have used various terms with different classification methods to identify industries with high intangibles. Examples of the terms being used are: intangible-intensive industries (Collins et al., 1997) , hightechnology industries (Barron et al., 2002) and 'new' vs 'old' economy (Abdolmohammadi, 2005) . related studies shows the effect of ownership structure and/or institutional environment on the quality of financial reporting (Holthausen, 2009 , Kothari, 2000 , Ball, 2001 ), focus on voluntary disclosure of intangibles especially of firms countries in the East Asian market is limited. In the light of the gaps in prior studies, this study has tested whether firms' voluntary disclosure of intangibles is jointly influenced by managerial ownership and the quality of the institutional environment of their host country.
This study has shown that the quality of firms' voluntary disclosure of intangibles is not conditional on the level of managerial ownership, but is rather explained by country-level institutional environment. More specifically, lower quality voluntarily disclosed information on intangibles is shown by firms in stronger institutional environment compared to their counterparts in weaker institutional environment. This study finds no evidence on the joint effect of the two governance mechanisms on firms' voluntary disclosure of intangibles. The results are robust because they are consistent even when I use different disclosure scores and control for cross-listed US firms and high-tech firms. The findings suggest that, despite the incentives of managerial ownership and the institutional environment, firms' still view voluntary disclosure of intangibles as an important mechanism in providing investors with information about corporate investment in intangibles.
This study offers several avenues for future research. First, measurement of the variables can be improved in several ways. Future research can focus on other sources of corporate disclosure of intangibles and other measures of ownership such as institutional ownership.
This study can be extended by differentiating between shares held by executive and non-executive directors because there are different managerial incentives involved with those two categories of directorship. Second, there is an opportunity to analyse firms' voluntary disclosure of intangibles in other markets to utilise the institutional features of the markets. Third, research on voluntary disclosure of intangibles would benefit more industryspecific factors that focus on specific intangibles that are important to the particular industries. 
